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INTRODUCTION

In 2014, The New York Times profiled Tranquilina Alvillar,1 a 50-year old Brooklyn
resident who, due to her landlord’s avarice, was pushed out of her apartment in the borough’s
trendy Williamsburg neighborhood. Ms. Alvillar—a low-income Mexican immigrant with a poor
command of English—stood by with little recourse as her landlord gradually nudged her
apartment into a state of disrepair, “removing building walls and tearing up floors” in hopes that
she would leave of her own volition. He soon got his wish, and quickly began renovating the
building to make room for tenants able to pay thousands more for the space she once called home.
* I would like to extend a special thanks to Professors Esme Caramello and Eloise Lawrence for their thoughtful
comments on previous drafts. This piece would not be what it is without their guidance, and for that I am extremely
grateful. I would also like to thank the fantastic team of editors on the Journal of Law and Social Change for all of their
hard work improving this article. Any remaining oversights are my own.
1

Julie Satow, In Twist, Tenant Who Was Forced Out Will Displace One Who Moved In, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/19/nyregion/in-twist-tenant-who-was-forced-out-will-displace-onewho-moved-in.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/ZLX6-KXV7].
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It seems over the course of the decade prior, Williamsburg, once a haven for recent immigrants
and lower-income minorities, had become a sought-after destination for young, highly educated,
upwardly mobile professionals searching for homes close to Manhattan. 2 As generally occurs
during this process, landlords, developers, and investors took note of the neighborhood’s changing
demographics and capitalized on it.3 Residents like Alvillar were caught in their crosshairs.
However, The New York Times article depicts a bundled Alvillar standing triumphantly
on the street in the heart of Williamsburg because, unlike most in her situation, Alvillar’s story
ended victoriously. After a protracted and contentious legal battle against the landlord, the
Housing Court ruled that Alvillar had been “illegally locked out” and ordered that she be allowed
to return.4 But for many in Alvillar’s situation, their stories do not end positively. Theirs are
stories of displacement; tales becoming more common in New York neighborhoods like
Williamsburg, Harlem, and Chinatown. 5 As residential patterns change, these once strong
minority enclaves are growing whiter, richer, denser, and more expensive than at any point in
recent history. With higher earners moving into these changing communities, long-time residents
like Alvillar are being pushed out by forces that are not always as easily identified as an
unscrupulous landlord. In those situations, little recourse exists to remedy their upheaval.
The literature on displacement—and its some-time precursor, gentrification6—is
voluminous.7 Countless scholars and social commentators have written about the recent wave of
2

See Ivan Pereira, Williamsburg leads NYC in gentrification, Report Says, AM NEW YORK (May 11, 2016),
http://www.amny.com/real-estate/williamsburg-leads-nyc-in-gentrification-report-says-1.11786129
[https://perma.cc/6YT7-PZX9] (describing the various demographic metrics in which Williamsburg has changed in recent
years); see also Tanvi Misra, Inside Pre-Gentrification Williamsburg, CITYLAB (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.citylab.com
/housing/2016/04/a-time-capsule-showing-pre-gentrification-williamsburg/476958/
[https://perma.cc/MRK2-EGG8]
(reviewing a documentary that highlights the neighborhood’s “Dominican-Puerto Rican” past).
3
See Gavin Mueller, Liberalism and Gentrification, JACOBIN (Sept. 26, 2014), https://www.jacobinmag.
com/2014/09/liberalism-and-gentrification/ [https://perma.cc/Q297-NGKN] (“Gentrification has always been a top-down
affair, not a spontaneous hipster influx, orchestrated by the real estate developers and investors who pull the strings of city
policy, with individual home-buyers deployed in mopping up operations.”).
4

Satow, supra note 1.

5

For an analysis on gentrification in these neighborhoods, see TOM ANGOTTI & SYLVIA MORSE, ZONED
OUT! RACE, DISPLACEMENT, AND CITY PLANNING IN NEW YORK CITY (2016).
6

Despite providing fodder for countless think pieces and scholarly articles, the exact definition of
gentrification is an unsettled topic. One of the more respected definitions comes from Professors Loretta Lees, Elvin Wyly,
and Tom Slater, who describe gentrification as “the transformation of a working-class or vacant area of the central city into
middle-class residential or commercial use.” LORETTA LEES ET AL., GENTRIFICATION xv (2008). Additionally, for the
purposes of this paper, we will assume some kind of causal link between gentrification and displacement. However, it is
important to note that the relationship between gentrification and displacement is hotly contested, and even among
scholars who agree that a causal relationship exists between the two phenomena, little consensus exists on how that
relationship functions in practice. See Richard Florida, The Complicated Link Between Gentrification and Displacement,
CITYLAB (September 8, 2015), http://www.citylab.com/housing/2015/09/the-complicated-link-between-gentrification-anddisplacement/404161/ [https://perma.cc/LVK8-5KH3].
7

See, e.g., Rowland Atkinson, Measuring Gentrification and Displacement in Greater London, 37 URB.

STUDIES 149 (2000) (finding evidence of displacement in gentrifying London neighborhoods); Kate Newman & Elvin K.
Wyly, The Right to Stay Put, Revisited: Gentrification and Resistance to Displacement in New York City, 43 URB. STUDIES
23, 29 (2006) (estimating that between 6-10% of all moves out of New York City between 1989 and 2002 were due to
gentrification-fueled displacement).
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changing urban centers in cities like New York, Washington, D.C., Oakland, and Los Angeles.
However, while commentary on this phenomenon abounds, little consensus exists on its precise
causes. Some scholars present gentrification-fueled displacement as symptom of myriad economic
forces that are hard to identify. 8 Others instead focus on the actors most clearly at fault for
particular instances of displacement, including landlords and the developers of new luxury
residences that have quickly come to characterize gentrifying neighborhoods. 9 Few scholars,
however, have focused on the role that local governments can play in fueling gentrification and
displacement. Cities, in their capacity as the chief architects of our country’s zoning policy,
certainly have an outsized role in shaping the development patterns of our urban centers. While
much has been written about exclusionary zoning’s ability to keep particular demographics out of
neighborhoods,10 few have fully explored the way that liberal zoning policies (i.e. upzoning 11) can
precipitate a demographic influx into a neighborhood (as well as the resulting wave of
displacement that comes afterward).12
Similarly, while much has been written about the policy prescriptions for gentrification
and displacement, little exists on legal solutions to these vexing challenges. 13 Interestingly,
several scholars and advocates are now looking to a recent Supreme Court decision, Texas
Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. (Inclusive
Communities Project),14 as one possible avenue for legal redress.15 In Inclusive Communities
8

See, e.g., Adam Hengels, Only 2 Ways to Fight Gentrification (you’re not going to like one of them),
MARKET URBANISM (Jan. 28, 2015), http://marketurbanism.com/2015/01/28/2-ways-to-fight-gentrification/
[https://perma.cc/3V7C-6TGE] (“Gentrification is the result of powerful economic forces. Those who misunderstand the
nature of the economic forces at play, risk misdirecting those forces in ways that exasperate city-wide displacement.
Before discussing solutions, it is important to accept that gentrification is one symptom of a larger problem.”).
9

See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 3.

10

See, e.g., Andrew H. Whittemore, The Experience of Racial and Ethnic Minorities with Zoning in the
United States, 32 J. PLAN. LITERATURE, 16, 17 – 20 (2017); Allison Shertzer et al., Race, Ethnicity, and Discriminatory
Zoning, 8 AM. ECON. J. 217, 234 – 36 (2016).
11

For a comprehensive definition of “upzoning,” see Richard W. Bartke and John S. Lamb, Upzoning,
Public Policy, and Fairness - A Study and Proposal, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 701, 702 n.10 (1976) (“‘Upzoning’ is a
change in zoning classification from less intensive to more intensive; ‘downzoning’ refers to the opposite phenomenon.
The change may be in the use (e.g., from single family to multiple residential use), bulk (e.g., from 15,000 sq. ft. minimum
lot size to 7,500 sq. ft.), or height (e.g., from 30 ft. maximum height to 60 ft. maximum); occasionally upzoning may
involve all three elements. Upzoning is most frequently a result of a map amendment, although a text amendment may also
be involved.”).
12

See Whittemore, supra note 10, at 20 (“A limited amount of research to date has considered how
minorities may be excluded (via displacement) from gentrifying neighborhoods by zoning decisions allowing construction
of upmarket housing.”). But see ANGOTTI & MORSE, supra note 5 (arguing that upzoning has caused gentrification and
displacement in multiple New York neighborhoods); Melissa Checker, Wiped Out by the “Greenwave”: Environmental
Gentrification and the Paradoxical Politics of Urban Sustainability, 24 CITY & SOC’Y 210 (making the same argument,
focused on Harlem).
13
But see, e.g., Lawrence K. Kolodney, Eviction Free Zones: The Economics of Legal Bricolage in the
Fight Against Displacement, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 507 (1990) (arguing for the enforcement of “Eviction Free Zones” in
gentrifying neighborhoods under the doctrine implied warranty of habitability).
14

135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).

15

See Tanvi Misra, New York City Has Been Zoned to Segregate, CITYLAB (Jan. 25, 2017),
http://www.citylab.com/housing/2017/01/new-york-city-has-been-zoned-to-segregate/514142/
[https://perma.cc/SGZ5-
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Project, the Court established that disparate impact claims were cognizable under the Fair
Housing Act (FHA). Despite circuit court unanimity on the issue, until the Inclusive Communities
Project decision, Supreme Court jurisprudence only recognized claims of housing discrimination
grounded in actions that were on their face discriminatory.16 With this ruling, the Court affirmed
that it would also recognize housing discrimination claims brought against facially neutral actions
that, nevertheless, had disparate negative impacts on a protected class. In the wake of this
decision, several housing discrimination cases have brought disparate impact claims using the
Court’s guidance on the issue.17 And yet, despite rumblings about the possibility of disparate
impact litigation against municipal upzoning decisions, no litigant or scholar has explored this
issue fully.
This paper aims to fill these existing gaps in the literature in two ways. First, this paper
aims to tease out the relationship between liberal zoning policies and gentrification/displacement.
By focusing on research done in several gentrifying New York neighborhoods, this paper looks to
establish a framework of causality between upzoning decisions and displacement upon which a
hypothetical disparate impact claim could rest. Second, this paper aims to explore the legal merits
of such a claim. After outlining the Supreme Court’s analysis in Inclusive Communities Project,
this paper endeavors to show that, while potentially attractive, disparate impact claims against
urban upzoning policies will likely not succeed, given the current state of Fair Housing
jurisprudence.
Before proceeding, it is important to address why an ostensibly unsuccessful litigation
strategy warrants such extensive academic analysis. First, as stated previously, housing advocates
are currently looking to disparate impact theory as a possible vehicle for addressing issues with
urban upzoning.18 This strategy therefore warrants a thorough vetting before public interest
litigants expend considerable time, money, and energy into a case set for failure. Second, and
perhaps most important, the urban upzoning hypothetical helps illustrate the ways in which the
Court’s decision in Inclusive Communities Project actually limits the reach of disparate impact
claims under the FHA. By refining the test for how litigants prove disparate impact, the Court
actually established how difficult a bar this is to clear. Urban upzoning presents a paradigmatic
example of a policy that seems to cause a disparately discriminate impact, but does not reach the
Court’s strict requirements for what actually constitutes causation. In that way, this hypothetical
could serve as a case study for all future disparate impact litigants interested in establishing a
convincing prima facie showing of racial discrimination.
This paper will proceed in four parts. Part I explores the relationship between zoning and
racial exclusion, briefly discussing the more traditional ways in which zoning policy has
disadvantaged low income minorities (i.e. exclusionary zoning and expulsive zoning), before
turning to a more in-depth discussion of the ways upzoning policies can potentially cause racially
7ZX2] (interviewing Thomas Angotti and Sylvia Morse on their book Zoned Out, who mention that the inspiration for the
book was a series of conversations with attorneys regarding the possibility of bringing a lawsuit against the city of New
York for its upzoning policies under disparate impact theory).
16

For a brief introduction to intentional discrimination jurisprudence, see S. Lamar Gardner, Note,
#BlackLivesMatter, Disparate-Impact, and the Property Agenda, 43 S.U. L. REV. 321, 332 – 33 (2016).
17
See e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 2:13–cv–09007–ODW, 2015 WL 4398858
(C.D. Cal. July 17, 2015); Dekalb Cnty., Georgia v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-3640-AT, 2016 WL
3958732 (N.D. Ga. Jun. 29, 2016); City of Miami v. Bank of America Corp., 171 F.Supp.3d 1314 (S.D. Fla. 2016).
18

See Misra, supra note 15.
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discriminatory displacement. Part II then turns to the existing case law on the subject, recounting
the ways that federal courts have historically viewed the relationship between zoning and racial
discrimination, before shifting to a discussion of how that landscape has changed (or not changed)
in a post-Inclusive Communities world. Part III bridges the content of the two previous sections by
taking a hypothetical case against urban upzoning through the Supreme Court’s current test for
disparate impact discrimination. This Part will argue that, given the current case law on the topic,
resting this kind of discrimination claim on disparate impact theory will likely prove unsuccessful.
Part IV concludes with possible alternative mechanisms for addressing urban displacement,
specifically focusing on potential policy changes to municipal zoning processes that might result
in a more sensible and equitable housing landscape.
I. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND MUNICIPAL ZONING POLICY

In their seminal work on zoning law in the United States, Professors Charles Haar and
Jerold Kayden describe American zoning policy as having its origins in the “idealist[ic]” social
reform movements of the early 1900’s. 19 According to Haar and Kayden, this movement pieced
together a “ragtag group” of “the most diverse origins” to advocate for this groundbreaking
reorientation of urban development. 20 However, this progressive and pluralistic description of
American zoning policy’s roots neglects to mention the more iniquitous passions that helped
propel the policy to its current level of prominence. More specifically, many of the earliest zoning
laws were not aimed at finding the perfect balance of building uses across urban space, but were
instead targeted at codifying in law the unwritten lines of racial segregation. 21 As early as 1910,
southern cities like Baltimore, Richmond, and Louisville were experimenting with ways to
formalize the separation of races through their cities’ zoning codes. 22 And although these more
invidious zoning ordinances were eventually struck down by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Buchanan v. Warley,23 these earliest pieces of legislation served as the intellectual precursors (and
inspirations) for the second generation of zoning ordinances that proved more permanent. 24
Indeed, while the expansive zoning ordinances that eventually came to pass in northern
cities like New York had no mention of race, their facially neutral text was often used to
discriminatory ends.25 Judge Westenhaver, in his 1924 opinion in Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of
Euclid,26 recognized this truth, striking down a facially neutral Ohio zoning ordinance on the
grounds that it aimed “to classify the population and segregate them according to their income or

19

Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden, ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 339 (1989).

20

Id.

21

See Christopher Silver, The Racial Origins of Zoning in American Cities, in URBAN PLANNING AND THE
AFRICAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY (Manning Thomas et al, eds., 1997).
22

See id. at 24.

23

245 U.S. 60 (1917).

24

See Silver, supra note 21; see also Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a Right
to Protective Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739, 740 – 41 (1993).
25
See Whittemore, supra note 10 at 17 (“[I]t is not surprising that behind the apparent rationality of
defending home values and managing the quality of services and infrastructure, there is an extensive history of racial and
ethnic hatreds informing zoning and its precedents, reminding us of the intertwined nature of markets and culture.”)
26

297 F. 307 (N.D. Ohio, 1926).
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situation in life.”27 Judge Westenhaver saw the exclusionary aims of the Village of Euclid’s
zoning ordinance as inimical to the Supreme Court’s decision on racial segregation in
Buchanan.28 However, the Supreme Court disagreed, and in 1926 overruled Judge Westenhaver’s
decision, recognizing for the first time the legality of facially neutral zoning laws in the United
States.29 The sections that follow outline two ways in which facially neutral zoning laws have
been (and still are) used to perpetuate racial segregation in U.S. cities: exclusionary and expulsive
zoning provisions. This Part then closes with an exploration of a third zoning policy—urban
upzoning—and evidence linking it to racial gentrification and displacement in cities like New
York.
A. Exclusionary Zoning Policies

Courts have defined exclusionary zoning as the use of a local zoning code as a tool for
preserving “enclaves of affluence and social homogeneity.” 30 In practice, exclusionary zoning
usually functions as a density restriction, with zoning boards or city councils limiting the lot sizes
or floor area ratios for residential units.31 For example, in order to preempt the construction of
high-density, multi-family units in a neighborhood, a city council might amend the zoning code to
prohibit residential units that fall below a minimum threshold of square footage (effectively
precluding the construction of apartment buildings, which almost universally have smaller
residential units than single-family homes). Alternatively, the city council in this hypothetical
might simply restrict new construction to single family homes or limit the number of bedrooms
allowed in apartments (thereby reducing the number of people that can live in them).
Each of these restrictions are, on their face, aimed simply at shaping a city’s built
environment by limiting the form and function of new construction. However, restrictions on a
city’s built environment have very real consequences for its socio-demographic make-up, directly
influencing the numbers of low-income, minority, or young residents that can move into the
newly restricted neighborhood.32 For example, the construction of affordable housing in suburban
or exurban areas generally requires developers to build multiple units in close proximity to each
other to help reduce costs.33 Apartment complexes or high-density, single-family units allow
affordable housing developers to recoup in volume (i.e. number of units sold) what they are
sacrificing in margins (i.e. profit off a single unit). By restricting the construction of these multifamily, high-density units, suburban officials are effectively shutting the door on the types of new
residents who might otherwise not be able to afford homes in their city. In this way, a facially
neutral zoning restriction, such as limiting lot sizes, has the second-order effect of preserving a
community’s racial or economic homogeneity.
27

Id. at 316.

28

Id. at 312 - 16.

29

Village of Euclid v. Abler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926).

30

Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 736 (N.J., 1975)
(Pashman, J., concurring).
31

See James J. Hartnett, Note, Affordable Housing, Exclusionary Zoning, and American Apartheid: Using
Title VIII to Foster Statewide Racial Integration, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 89, 96 (1993).
32

See id. at 97 – 98.

33

See id. at 97.
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It is generally undisputed that cities and their elected officials engage in these kinds of
exclusionary practices.34 Understanding why it occurs, however, is much more complicated.
While it may be emotionally satisfying to blame racial animus for the existence of these tactics,
the answer is rarely that easy. In truth, there is evidence to suggest that these kinds of
exclusionary practices exist wealthy neighborhoods regardless of their original racial
composition.35 For example, in historically wealthy and predominately black Prince George’s
County, Maryland, research shows residents engaging in various forms of class-based exclusion
typically attributed to white neighborhoods. 36
Instead of leaning on race as the sole explanation for why these practices exist, scholars
have put forth several other answers that help illuminate this troubling historical trend. According
to economist William Fischel, homeowners’ tendency to vote for exclusionary zoning provisions
stems from their natural desire to preserve the perceived value of their home and their
neighborhood.37 If a suburban neighborhood’s primary asset is its low-density, bucolic aesthetic,
the addition of high-density apartment complexes threatens the community’s comparative
advantage, potentially imperiling the value of residents’ homes in the process. Another
explanation looks to local taxes as a possible answer. The theory posits that wealthy homeowners
view an influx of low- and moderate-income residents as a potential tax burden.38 Additional
residents mean more crowded schools, more strained infrastructure, and more demand for social
services that wealthy residents rarely require. By restricting a city’s housing stock, residents may
be engaging less in purposeful racial exclusion, and more in a form of economic protectionism.
Whatever the explanation, exclusionary zoning practices have proven enduring despite
decades of court cases aimed at outlawing them. Part of the reason why these policies have proven
so resilient in the face of discrimination claims has been the Supreme Court’s notable
ambivalence on the issue. Despite numerous federal district and circuit court decisions holding
exclusionary zoning in violation of the FHA, 39 the Court has yet to give a full-throated
endorsement of this position. Instead, the few Supreme Court cases on the issue have left litigants
with little insight into the Court’s current stance on the practice.
During the earliest cases against exclusionary zoning, the Supreme Court struck an
ostensibly deferential posture toward local zoning ordinances. For example, in Warth v. Seldin40
the Court held that a group of plaintiffs including low-income Rochester residents, Rochester
34

See Whittemore, supra note 10 at 17 – 20 (providing examples of exclusionary zoning from its inception
in the 1900’s to the present).
35

See, e.g., Susan Saulny, On the Inside Looking Out, WASH. POST. (July 8, 1996),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1996/07/08/on-the-inside-and-looking-out/4c4de690-832a-4a97-8059d373c27c4e73/?utm_term=.528f7f4b1edf [https://perma.cc/M6NC-BUYH]
36

See id.

37

William Fischel, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES (2001).
38

See Hartnett, supra note 31, at 97.

39

See e.g. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1294 (7th Cir. 1977)
(holding that an ordinance prohibiting new construction to single family homes would violate the FHA if it precluded the
development of new affordable housing within the city’s limits); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1188
(8th Cir. 1974) (determining that an ordinance preventing the construction of multi-family homes was prohibited by the
FHA).
40

422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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taxpayers, and the Rochester Homebuilder’s Association lacked standing in their case against a
Rochester suburb’s (Penfield) exclusionary zoning provisions. 41 According to the Court, none of
the plaintiffs could point to an addressable injury caused by Penfield’s housing policy, and
therefore no controversy existed on which the Court could rule. Similarly, in the 1977 case,
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation,42 the Supreme
Court overturned a Seventh Circuit decision striking down a local provision against multi-family
units.43 The Court held that disparate impact claims were not cognizable under the Equal
Protection Clause, and that plaintiffs had not carried their burden of illustrating a discriminatory
purpose for the policy. However, in the 1988 case, Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch,
NAACP, the Court inched back in the other direction on the issue by providing a tepid per curium
affirmance of a Second Circuit decision, which found disparate impact in an exclusionary zoning
battle.44 Taken together, these decisions paint an unclear picture of the Supreme Court’s
exclusionary zoning jurisprudence. Given this lack of clarity, it is little wonder that cities have
marched forward with these ostensibly discriminatory provisions undeterred.
B. Expulsive Zoning Policies

Unlike exclusionary zoning, which uses the zoning code as a mechanism to keep
particular demographics out of a city, expulsive (also known as “intensive”) zoning uses the code
to reshape the living conditions for low-income minority residents within a city. Expulsive zoning
typically occurs by liberalizing use-based restrictions in particular neighborhoods, pushing
industrial or commercial buildings into minority residential communities. 45 Imagine, for example,
a completely residential municipality split evenly between low-income minority and upperincome white residents. Years after incorporation, the city decides that, in an effort to diversify its
tax base, it will allocate some of its land for industrial uses. However, the city has to put this new
industrial land somewhere, and the white residents soon mobilize to ensure this new zoning
designation does not encroach upon their neighborhood. Left with little alternative, the city
chooses to rezone part of the minority neighborhood for industrial use, allowing a bevy of highly
pollutant companies to set up shop in the once exclusively residential area. Gradually, the
minority neighborhood spirals into a state of neglect, as residents uncomfortable with the new
nuisances leave for somewhere more palatable.
As this example illustrates, expulsive zoning practices turn on the unequal distribution of
political power between upper-income white communities and their lower-income minority
neighbors. White residents within cities generally have more access to political capital than their
minority counterparts, possibly due to superior fundraising ability, better understanding of local
government infrastructure, and more experience with political mobilization. 46 Whatever the
41

Id. at 493.

42

429 U.S. 252 (1977).

43

Id. at 254 – 255.

44
488 U.S. 15, 18 (1988) (per curiam) (refusing to decide on whether the lower courts use of the disparate
impact test was appropriate).
45

See Dubin, supra note 24, at 742 (citing Yale Rabin, Expulsive Zoning: The Inequitable Legacy of
Euclid, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 101 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989)) (describing the
practice of expulsive zoning as “superimposing incompatible zoning on communities of color”).
46

See generally Sidney Verba et al., Race, Ethnicity and Political Resources: Participation in the United
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reason, this access buys well-heeled neighborhoods protection from unwanted use-designations,
forcing city officials to either forgo this additional source of tax revenue, or find somewhere else
to put it. Too often these unwanted zoning designations get shunted onto the residents with the
smallest voice in the political arena. Research on this practice supports this assertion: scholars
studying this issue over the course of the 20th century have shown evidence of expulsive practices
in cities like Birmingham,47 Baltimore,48 and Charlotte,49 just to name a few.50
Similar to discrimination claims against exclusionary zoning, successful litigation against
expulsive zoning practices has been hard to come by. Unfortunately, in the case of expulsive
zoning, this stems in part from a sheer lack of cases on the topic, successful or otherwise.51 While
courts have historically recognized that minority neighborhoods tend to have more incompatible
land-use designations than their white counterparts,52 few cases have turned on this disparity. One
notable exception to the judiciary’s deafening silence on the issue was the California appellate
court’s decision in O’Rourke v. Teeters.53 In O’Rourke, a black electrician challenged the city of
Los Angeles’ zoning ordinance designating his neighborhood exclusively residential. 54 According
to him, this designation prevented him from opening up an electrical shop near his home, which,
ironically, was the only neighborhood not closed off to him due to private racial covenants. 55
Irrespective of these restrictions, the court sided against the plaintiff,56 and, in doing so, provided
possibly the only decision unequivocally rejecting expulsive zoning practices in the country. 57
Given the unusual circumstances of this case (a black business owner attempting to locate in a
black residential neighborhood during the era of de jure racial segregation), it is unsurprising that
future courts have not looked to this case as a source of precedent.
It is unclear why courts have heard so few cases on the issue of expulsive zoning. One
possible explanation is that the harm associated with expulsive zoning decisions occurs gradually,
and therefore plaintiffs struggle to find the opportune moment to bring a case. 58 A zoning board or
States, 23 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 453 (1993) (illustrating how varying levels of political participation by race can be attributed
to unequal access to political resources such as education).
47

See CHARLES CONNERLY, THE MOST SEGREGATED CITY IN AMERICA: CITY PLANNING AND CIVIL
RIGHTS IN BIRMINGHAM, 1920 – 1980 (2005).
48

See Yale Rabin, Expulsive Zoning: The Inequitable Legacy of Euclid, in Zoning and the American
Dream: Promises to Keep, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 107 – 8 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds.,
1989).
49
See THOMAS HANCHETT, SORTING OUT THE NEW SOUTH CITY: RACE, CLASS, AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT IN CHARLOTTE 1875–1975 116 (1998).
50

For a more fulsome discussion of expulsive zoning and its implications, see Whittemore, supra note 10,

51

See Dubin, supra note 24, at 761.

at 20 – 23.
52

See, e.g., West Bros. Brick Co. v. City of Alexandria, 192 S.E. 881, 884 (1937) (describing a nonresidential neighborhood as being characterized, in part, by the presence of “colored settlement[s]”).
53

146 P.2d 983 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944).

54

Id. at 984 & n.1.

55

Id. at 984.

56

Id. at 985.

57

See Dubin, supra note 24, at 762.

58

For examples of the impacts of expulsive zoning on African American communities, see Whittemore,
supra note 10, at 21 - 22.
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city council’s decision to change a neighborhood’s zoning designation will not automatically
mean that an incompatible entity will set up shop in that community. Indeed, it may sometimes
take years for industry to respond to a zoning change by moving into a neighborhood. At that
point residents may no longer attribute the company’s unwanted arrival to the decision their
elected officials made years prior. Another potential explanation is that residents (and courts)
might not view the changed designation as an unmitigated harm. After all, changing a
neighborhood’s zoning designation to allow for industrial or commercial uses might result in the
arrival of new job opportunities or sorely needed commercial amenities. In these cases, fighting
the unwanted designation might not be worth it, if it results in a loss of public goods on which the
community has come to rely.59
C. Upzoning Policies

As stated previously, upzoning is defined as a “change in zoning classification from less
intensive to more intensive,” typically effectuated through zoning map amendments allowing for
taller and denser units than those previously occupying the space.60 Although upzoning changes
generally occur by loosening density restrictions, these changes often co-present with use
amendments changing a neighborhood from a purely residential to “mixed-use” categorization.61
Given this description, it might not be immediately clear why residents would object to upzoning
policies on racial discrimination grounds. After all, the primary criticism of exclusionary zoning
tactics is that municipalities are too restrictive with their density regulations, precluding the
development of new affordable housing. By that logic, would equity advocates not laud a city’s
decision to loosen these restrictions, allowing for the development of more units? Similarly,
criticism of expulsive zoning focuses on the addition of noxious disamenities to low-income,
minority neighborhoods. Should we not then celebrate cities trying to use their zoning codes to
make neighborhoods more livable for more people?
While the chorus of critics against upzoning is not yet as loud as those against
exclusionary or expulsive zoning practices, the arguments against these trends are actually
grounded in a similar theory. In order to better understand this theory, recall Fischel’s argument
that exclusionary zoning tactics are not grounded in racial prejudice, but in the desire to protect
(and potentially grow) an economic asset. 62 In the suburban hamlets where exclusionary zoning
typically occurs, that economic asset is a large, single family home in a bucolic, low-density,
homogenous neighborhood. The land in that neighborhood has become valuable precisely because
it can offer consumers the idyllic environment that they so desire. Therefore, in order to protect
the land’s value, residents do what they can to prevent changes that might abrogate this desirable
aesthetic (i.e. preventing the development of affordable housing and multifamily units). Land in
neighborhoods like Williamsburg, however, derives its primary market value from a different
quality. For land in the urban core, demand is driven by its ability to allow consumers access to
the city’s “agglomorative” effects.63 Urban centers are valuable because they put residents in close
59
C.f. id. at 22 – 23 (noting that many of these incompatible industries might be drawn to low-income,
minority neighborhoods not simply because of their zoning designations, but for non-prejudicial economic reasons).
60

Bartke & Lamb, supra note 11.

61

See ANGOTTI & MORSE, supra note 5, at 23.

62

See Fischel, supra note 33.

63

Urban economist Edward Glaeser defines agglomeration as the “benefits that come when firms and
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proximity to jobs, commerce, culture, recreation, infrastructure, and most importantly, other
people. It therefore makes sense that, in order to maximize its value, urban residents and officials
would push for zoning changes that maximize (or at least protect) the land’s agglomorative value
(i.e. upzoning).
In this way, upzoning changes are taking part in the same underlying activity as
exclusionary zoning tactics: maximizing the value of land in the hopes of attracting or retaining
mobile capital.64 The perhaps not so obvious corollary to this activity is that, by maximizing the
value of land, residents and elected officials are gradually pricing out consumers who can no
longer afford this product. In the case of exclusionary zoning, these consumers are the lowincome minorities who, but for the cost, would move to the desirable suburb. In the case of
upzoning, these consumers are often the low-income minority renters already living in the
neighborhood who are gradually pushed out (i.e. displaced) due to higher rents and pricier
surrounding amenities.
In their book Zoned Out, Professors Tom Angotti and Sylvia Morse put forth a similar
thesis for the causes of displacement in Manhattan and Brooklyn, arguing that “[u]pzoning
increases the future value of land, and land value increases are what drives new development.” 65
According to the authors, upzoning in New York influences displacement through an opaque yet
consistent four step process. First, developers, searching for a neighborhood for new construction,
target “underutilized” areas and begin assembling parcels of property on which to build. This
initial sign of economic movement from large developers often precipitates a “buying frenzy,”
and might also result in landlords gradually ending leases with low-income tenants in anticipation
of new rental demand.66 Second, developers will appeal to the Department of City Planning
(DCP) for a rezoning of their targeted neighborhood. 67 The DCP will engage in a series of studies
to determine if the proposed development requires a new zoning designation, and if there is
enough demand to warrant such a change. 68 As word gets around that the DCP is considering a
neighborhood for a revised zoning designation, a second flurry of speculative purchasing often
occurs with similar disruptive effects on the low-income, minority communities who already call
this “underutilized” neighborhood home. 69
Next, the planning board and developers will submit a formal rezoning proposal to the
City Planning Commission (CPC).70 It is worth noting that these kinds of proposals are almost
invariably initiated by well-resourced parties (i.e. government entities or corporate developers).71
people locate near one another together in cities and industrial clusters.” According to Glaeser, these benefits ultimately
derive from the decrease in transportation costs brought about by proximity. Goods, people, and ideas can move more
quickly and cheaply in urban centers, ultimately resulting in greater economic output than exists in places where capital is
more dispersed. EDWARD L. GLAESER, AGGLOMERATION ECONOMICS 1 (2010).
64
For a better understanding of the way cities tailor their policies to attract mobile capital, see generally
Richard Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the Democratic City, 123 HARV. L. REV. 482 (2009).
65

ANGOTTI & MORSE, supra note 5, at 29.

66

Id. at 29 – 30.

67

Id. at 30.

68

Id.

69

Id.

70

Id. at 31.

71

Id.
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This is due in no small part to the capital intensive nature of the New York zoning process. 72
Lower-income community members who may have similar interests in rezoning a neighborhood
to fit their needs will rarely have the time or money necessary to see that process to completion.
This ensures that when zoning changes do occur, they are disproportionately beneficial to the
parties with the most access and capital. Finally, the process closes with a formal Uniform Land
Use Review Procedure (ULURP).73 Through this process, the mayor, city council, CPC, borough
president, and local community boards all vote on the proposed zoning map amendment after a
series of hearings on the issue.74 Again, it is worth noting that although the local community
boards have a nominal say in the process, their votes carry the least weight and almost never
dispositively influence a zoning decision. 75
Angotti and Morse marshal convincing evidence to back up their assertion that upzoning
and minority displacement are causally linked. The authors note that in a study of 76 rezonings
between the years of 2003 and 2007, upzoned lots were disproportionately located in “areas [with]
higher concentrations of African American and Hispanic residents than the city median.”76 The
authors go on to illustrate that these upzonings have exerted upward pressure on everything from
property values and taxes, to rental costs and the types of small businesses that are able to operate
in the neighborhood.77 The rest of the book chronicles how this process has played out in the New
York neighborhoods of Williamsburg, Harlem, and Chinatown. 78 In each of these neighborhoods,
conscious decisions by the city government and developers to upzone particular areas resulted in
an increase in average rents,79 a reduction in affordable housing units, 80 an increase in white
residents, and a noticeable reduction in the neighborhood’s minority populations. 81
Before closing this section, it is worth addressing the fact that Angotti and Morse’s
depiction of the relationship between zoning, gentrification, and displacement is not universally
accepted. Instead, these scholars write primarily as voices dissenting against the litany of freemarket, pro-growth advocates pushing a supply-side theory of urban development. These “trickledown” economists, as Angotti and Morse coin them, advance a competing vision for the
relationship between zoning and displacement. According to this theory, low-income residents in
neighborhoods like Williamsburg and Harlem are not displaced because there is too much
upzoning, but because there is not enough of it. 82 In these high-demand areas, housing is a scarce
72

Id.

73

Id.

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Id. at 33.

77

Id. at 37 – 40.

78

Id. 72 – 141.

79

See, e.g., id. at 85 (describing how a rezoned area of Williamsburg experienced “residential and
commercial property values increas[ing] nearly 250 percent” and “median monthly gross rents swell[ing] from $949 to
$1603.”).
80
See, e.g., id. at 86 (noting that the rent-stabilized/subsidized percentage of the Greenpoint-Williamsburg
housing stock dropped from 64% to 51.7% in the years after upzoning occurred).
81

See, e.g., id. at 87 (“The white population in the rezoning area increased by 44 percent, compared to a 2
percent decline citywide. The Hispanic/Latino population declined by 27 percent, compared to a 10 percent increase
citywide.”).
82

For examples of this argument, see Matthew Yglesias, You Can’t Talk Housing Costs Without Talking
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good. Based on the laws of simple supply and demand, as demand for a scarce good rises, the
price of that good will also rise so long as the supply of said good does not rise at a commensurate
rate. Therefore, the supply-siders argue, the best way to counteract this trend is to increase the
supply of the scarce good (housing) by easing some of the barriers to new development (i.e.
zoning restrictions). These pro-growth advocates also marshal compelling evidence to support
their position83 and have received powerful endorsements from policymakers as influential as
President Obama.84 Although resolving this conflict is well beyond the scope of this paper, it is
important to recognize the contours of this debate, as it will likely influence the way judges will
interpret future claims against urban upzoning activity.
II. DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY AND THE FHA: AN ANALYSIS OF PRE- AND POST-INCLUSIVE
COMMUNITIES PROJECT JURISPRUDENCE

The FHA provides that “it shall be unlawful [t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of
a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable
or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national
origin.”85 Since the law’s inception, there has been little debate that it protected against the most
blatant and invidious forms of discrimination. 86 However, at the time of its passage, it was unclear
if the text stating “ . . . or otherwise make unavailable” also prohibited more subtle forms of
discrimination: actions that, though they did not carry discriminatory intent, nevertheless carried
clear discriminatory effects (i.e. facially neutral actions with disparate impacts). 87 As stated
previously, it was not until 2016, in Inclusive Communities Project, that the Supreme Court
decided conclusively that this language did in fact protect against disparate impact
discrimination.88 However, Inclusive Communities Project was the last in a long line of federal
cases finding disparate impact theory cognizable under the FHA. Indeed, at the time Inclusive
Communities Project was decided, every federal circuit court had already reached a similar
decision.89 In this way, the Supreme Court’s holding in Inclusive Communities Project was not
About Zoning, SLATE (Dec. 10, 2013, 8:50 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2013/12/10/housing_costs_it_s_
the_zoning_stupid.html [https://perma.cc/UM9B-HJGV]. See also Edward L. Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Impact of
Zoning on Housing Affordability, HARVARD INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH (March 2002),
https://law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/hier1948.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7S2-ZZQX] (arguing that housing costs
in places like Manhattan and many Californian cities have been inflated due to restrictive zoning laws).
83

See e.g., Glaeser & Gyourko, surpa note 79, at 19 – 21 (illustrating the strong correlation between
housing prices and intensity of zoning regulations in various cities).
84
See Lorraine Woellert, Obama Takes on Zoning Laws in Bid to Build More Housing, Spur Growth,
POLITICO (Sept. 26, 2016, 5:13 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/obama-takes-on-zoning-laws-in-bid-to-buildmore-housing-spur-growth-228650 [https://perma.cc/U9TP-MJEW].
85

42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).

86

See Trafficante v. Metro Life, 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (finding intentional discrimination in a housing
dispute under the FHA just four years after the law’s passage). See also Hartnett, supra note 31, at 94 (“[The FHA’s]
immediate effect was to eliminate the most blatant discriminatory practices of realtors, lenders, and landlords.”).
87
Cf. Hartnett, supra note 31, at 94 (arguing that the FHA’s passage might have pushed “both private and
public parties to employ more subtle devices, such as exclusionary zoning”).
88

See 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).

89

See Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2000); Mountain Side Mobile Estates
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actually charting much new territory, but was instead solidifying a determination that the lower
courts had already reached.
Part II of this paper briefly outlines the history of disparate impact litigation since the
FHA’s inception. Part II.A discusses the pre-Inclusive Communities Project disparate impact
cases decided at the federal circuit level. This section tracks the evolution of this jurisprudence,
highlighting some of the cases that first found this form of discrimination cognizable under the
FHA, as well as a few cases exploring the outer limits of disparate impact theory. Part II.B
discusses the Supreme Court’s decision in Inclusive Communities Project, including the test
established by Justice Kennedy for determining the existence of disparate impact discrimination.
Part II.C closes with a brief discussion of the post-Inclusive Communities Project cases,
highlighting the ways in which Kennedy’s new test has raised the bar for proving disparate impact
discrimination, fundamentally changing the landscape for this type of litigation.
A. Pre-Inclusive Communities Project Cases

One of the first cases finding disparate impact discrimination cognizable under the FHA
was United States v. City of Blackjack in 1974.90 In the years leading up to this case, the nonprofit
organization Inter Religious Center for Urban Affairs (ICUA), established an ambitious plan to
address the dual crises of racial segregation and substandard housing in predominantly black St.
Louis neighborhoods by providing an “alternative housing opportunit[y] for persons of low and
moderate income . . . in the form of 108 units of two-story townhouses.”91 Aware of the
nonprofit’s affordable housing campaign, the newly incorporated suburb of Blackjack, Missouri
quickly put in place a set of zoning restrictions aimed at preventing the ICUA’s intended
construction.92 The nonprofit sued, claiming in part that the city’s new zoning ordinance had a
discriminatory impact on black residents locked into substandard neighborhoods by a ring of allwhite suburbs walled off by land-use prohibitions.93
The Eighth Circuit agreed.94 In reaching its decision, the court analogized to a set of
employment discrimination cases where disparate impact claims had already been recognized as

P’ship v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1243, 1250-51 (10th Cir. 1995); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of
Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 935 (2d Cir. 1988); Hanson v. Veterans Admin., 800 F.2d 1381, 1386 (5 th Cir. 1986); Arthur v.
City of Toledo, Ohio 782 F.2d 565, 574-75 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Marengo Cnty. Comm’n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1559
n.20 (11th Cir. 1984); Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir. 1982); Smith v. Town of Clarkton, N.C., 682
F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir.
1977) [hereinafter Arlington Heights I]; Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146 (3d Cir. 1977); United States
v. City of Black Jack, Mo., 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir. 1974).
90

508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974).

91

Id. at 1182.

92

Id. at 1183.

93

Cf. id. (referencing the district courts findings that “the concentration of blacks in the city and in pockets
in the county [was] accompanied by the confinement of a disproportionate number of them in overcrowded or substandard
accommodations.” The court went on to note that “the average cost of a home in the City of Black Jack in 1970 was
approximately $30,000, and that the average income of Black Jack families [was] approximately $15,000 per year,”
effectively precluding most black residents from purchasing a home in this newly incorporated suburb).
94

Id. at 1188.
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cognizable forms of discrimination.95 The court argued that, in the same way Congress prohibited
“artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment” based on race, similar barriers to
housing must also be held impermissible. 96 It went on to contend that while localities certainly
had the latitude and autonomy to craft particularized zoning policy, that authority could be
cabined in cases “where the clear result of such discretion is the segregation of low-income
[b]lacks from all [w]hite neighborhoods.”97 The court made clear that the critical feature of this
instance of discrimination was not the city’s’ invidious intent, but instead the racially
discriminatory effects their actions had on the black residents unable to acquire housing in their
town.98 In so holding, the Eighth Circuit broke new ground by becoming one of the first federal
circuit courts to recognize the legal legitimacy of disparate impact claims.
One of the most frequently cited disparate impact cases is Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights. Here, a nonprofit religious organization
partnered with a local developer to build nearly 200 units of affordable multifamily housing in the
Village of Arlington Heights.99 At the time, an Arlington Heights zoning ordinance prohibited the
construction of multifamily homes on the parcel of property aimed for development. 100 After
being denied their request to rezone the parcel of land in question, the developers sued the city on
the grounds that their restrictive zoning code had a discriminatory impact on low-income
minorities in surrounding neighborhoods.101 As stated previously, the Seventh Circuit originally
decided this case not under the FHA, but instead on equal protection grounds. It was this equal
protection argument that eventually was granted certiorari by the Supreme Court, and was
ultimately overruled.102
One remand, the Seventh Circuit took a different tack, instead siding with the plaintiffs
on grounds that the FHA protected against the kind of disparate impact caused by Arlington
Heights’s zoning ordinance.103 In so doing, the court recognized that discriminatory intent was not
necessary for a legally cognizable claim under the FHA, and outlined a four-part balancing test for
determining if plaintiffs had reached the requisite burden of proof for establishing a disparate
impact claim. This balancing test considered 1) the plaintiff’s showing of disparate impact (i.e.
discriminatory effect); 2) any evidence of discriminatory intent; 3) the defendant’s justification for
the discriminatory action; and 4) whether the plaintiff was seeking to compel the defendant to
construct additional housing, or simply requesting that the defendant not interfere in the provision
of housing that was already underway. 104 Although the Seventh Circuit ultimately remanded the
95

Id. at 1184 (citing the employment decision Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, finding disparate
impact claims cognizable under Title VII).
96

Id.

97

Id.

98

Id. at 1185 (“The plaintiff need make no showing whatsoever that the action resulting in racial
discrimination in housing was racially motivated.”).
99

Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1286 (7th Cir. 1977).

100

Id.

101

Id. at 1285.

102

See Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An Appellate Analysis of Forty
Years of Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 357, 367 – 68 (2013).
103

Id. See also Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1287 – 88.

104

Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1290.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018

282

UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE

[Vol. 21.4

case to the district level to determine an appropriate remedy, 105 this decision signaled a watershed
moment for the court in that the Seventh Circuit had definitively aligned itself with the Eighth and
Third106 Circuits in recognizing the cognizability of disparate impact claims.
The most recent federal appellate court decision recognizing the legality of disparate
impact housing discrimination claims was the First Circuit’s Langlois v. Abington House
Authority. In this case, eight suburban housing authorities, in an effort to retool their Section 8
voucher application process, established a centralized lottery system for processing future
applicants.107 A defining feature of this lottery system was that it preferenced the local residents of
each municipality where the housing authorities were located over nonlocal applicants residing
outside those municipalities.108 In practice, because the eight housing authority municipalities
were considerably whiter than their surrounding areas, this lottery system often favored white
applicants to the detriment of blacks and Latinos. 109
A team of plaintiffs, which included minorities from the surrounding areas as well as the
Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless, sued the eight housing authorities, claiming that the
system of local preferences violated the Equal Protection Clause as well as the FHA.110 The
district court agreed, and granted an injunction against the lottery system on the grounds that it
had a disparate discriminatory impact on minority lottery participants. 111 On appeal, although the
First Circuit was skeptical of the lower court’s rationale for finding disparate impact in this
case,112 it nevertheless fell in line with the other ten circuits, holding that disparate impact claims
were in fact cognizable under the FHA. 113
While all circuit courts have recognized disparate impact claims as cognizable under the
FHA, it appears not all disparate impact claims are created equal. In fact, while the courts have
been mostly amenable to disparate impact claims in cases where institutions have erected barriers
to the construction of new affordable housing (e.g. exclusionary zoning laws), they have been
more skeptical of claims against perceived housing improvements that have nonetheless caused
discriminatory effects.114 For example, in Catanzaro v. Weiden, plaintiffs sued the city of
Middletown, NY for its decision to demolish two low-income buildings after they had been
damaged in a car accident. 115 The plaintiffs argued that the demolition was part of a “calculated
campaign” to destabilize affordable housing in the city and drive away minority residents. 116 The
105

Id. at 1294.

106

See Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977).

107

Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 46 (1st Cir. 2000).

108

Id.

109

Id. at 47.

110

Id. at 46.

111

Id. at 47.

112

Id. at 51.

113

See id. at 49 (“[T]he consensus among the circuits that have discussed this issue in the housing context
is that the Fair Housing Act prohibits actions that have an unjustified disparate racial impact, and we find their reasoning
persuasive.”).
114

See generally Seicshnaydre, supra note 102 (arguing that the thrust of federal jurisprudence on FHA
disparate impact claims illustrates a bias against housing improvement cases as compared to housing barrier cases).
115

188 F.3d 56, 57 – 58 (2d Cir. 1999).

116

Id. at 60.
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Second Circuit, however, sided with the defendants, arguing that “[p]laintiffs have failed to
provide sufficient evidence from which it can be reasonably inferred that Defendant’s housing
policies have a discriminatory effect.” 117 Similarly, in Armendariz v. Penman, the Ninth Circuit
rejected plaintiffs’ claims that the City of San Bernardino had disparately impacted Hispanic
residents through a series of code enforcement sweeps. 118 According to the court, the plaintiffs
had not established sufficient evidence to illustrate that the code enforcement sweeps were part of
a broader racially discriminatory housing policy, and therefore the disparate impact claims were
unavailing.119 In fact, in her 2013 article Is Disparate Impact Having any Impact?, Professor
Stacy Seicshnaydre illustrates that over the past 40 years of FHA disparate impact litigation,
“plaintiffs succeeded twice as often in housing barrier cases (42%) than in housing improvement
cases (21%).”120
Why the courts would view housing improvement cases differently is less clear. A
review of the case law on the topic illustrates that, in many housing improvement cases, plaintiffs
have simply failed to establish a prima facie showing of discriminatory effect. 121 Many courts
seem to struggle with the fact that while the challenged housing improvement initiatives (e.g.
targeted revitalization efforts, blight demolition, code enforcement, etc.) clearly impacted a set of
minority residents in that particular instance, little evidence exists to suggests that these actions
presage a broader policy of discrimination against the larger minority community. 122 Indeed, just
because a city decided to demolish a set of homes that happened to have minority residents does
not indicate that they have established a policy that will consistently disadvantage minority
residents in a similar way. Additionally, courts also seem to struggle with the types of initiatives
targeted in these housing improvement cases. Blight demolition and neighborhood revitalization
efforts are, at least superficially, promoted as ameliorative tactics aimed at helping the targeted
communities.123 While few would dispute the spotty history of these efforts in actually achieving
their stated goals, it seems a particularly strong indictment to go the next step and charge them
with racial discrimination.124
B. The Inclusive Communities Project Decision

Through the Low Income Housing Tax Credit program (LIHTC), the federal government
encourages private investment in affordable housing by offering investors tax credits in exchange
for immediate capital provisions to low-income housing developments. 125 Although this a
117

Id. at 65.

118

31 F. 3d. 860, 868-869 (9th Cir. 1994).

119

Id.

120

Seicshnaydre, supra note 102, at 363.

121

See id. at 404 – 05.

122

Id.

123

See Andy Kitsinger, How Cities are Taking on Blight, PlannersWeb (May 21, 2014),
http://plannersweb.com/2014/05/cities-take-blight/ [https://perma.cc/X24D-4SDJ] (describing maintenance and demolition
strategies aimed at ameliorating blight in low income neighborhoods).
124
Cf. id. at 406 (recognizing that while “housing improvement plans have operated in particular cases to
prevent the return of minorities to the ‘improved’ area’ their justification is still a matter of “great[ ] dispute”).
125
Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2513 (2015).
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federally funded program, LIHTC credits are distributed to developers by state entities more
familiar with local affordable housing needs. 126 In Texas, the Department of Housing and
Community Affairs (the Department) allocates these credits based on a particular set of
preferences including that “low-income housing units ‘contribut[e] to a concerted community
revitalization plan’ and be built in census tracts populated predominantly by low-income
residents.”127
Between 1999 and 2008, the Department approved credits for 49.7% of the proposed
developments in areas where whites made up less than 10% of the population, and 37.4% of the
proposed developments in places where whites made up more than 90% of the population. 128
According to the Inclusive Communities Project plaintiffs, this disparate allocation of credits
resulted in an uneven distribution of low-income units funded with LIHTC credits: 92.29% of
Dallas’s LIHTC units were built in majority minority census tracts. 129 Plaintiffs, led by the
nonprofit housing equity organization Inclusive Communities Project (ICP), sued the Department,
alleging, in part, that they had created a disparately discriminatory impact in violation of the
FHA.130
The district court sided with the plaintiffs, arguing that although the government had a
sound justification for its credit allocation scheme, the Department “failed to meet [its] burden of
proving that there [were] no less discriminatory alternatives.”131 The Fifth Circuit reversed and
remanded, but in doing so declined to overturn the court’s long-standing precedent that disparate
impact claims were cognizable under the FHA. 132 Instead, the appellate court advised that the
lower court reassess the case in light of HUD’s newly provided burden-shifting framework, which
required the following analysis:
(1) The charging party . . . has the burden of proving that a challenged practice
caused or predictably will cause a discriminatory effect.
(2) Once the charging party or plaintiff satisfies the burden of proof set forth in
[the previous paragraph] of this section, the respondent or defendant has the
burden of proving that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or
more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent or
defendant.
(3) If the respondent or defendant satisfies the burden of proof set forth in [the
previous paragraph] of this section, the charging party or plaintiff may still
prevail upon proving that the substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests
supporting the challenged practice could be served by another practice that has a

126

Id.

127

Id.

128

Id. at 2514.

129

Id.

130

Id.

131

Id.

132

Id. at 2515.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol21/iss4/1

2018]

NEIGHBORHOOD UPZONING AND RACIAL DISPLACEMENT

285

less discriminatory effect 133
The Department appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.134 Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority, affirmed the lower courts’ decisions that disparate impact claims were
cognizable under the FHA.135 Analogizing to Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (finding disparate impact
claims cognizable in employment discrimination cases) and Smith v. City of Jackson (finding
disparate impact claims cognizable in age discrimination cases), 136 Kennedy argued that
“antidiscrimination laws must be construed to encompass disparate-impact claims when their text
refers to the consequences of actions.” 137 He contended that the FHA’s provision against actions
that “otherwise make [housing] unavailable” due to race addressed discriminatory consequences
in the same way as similar language in employment and age discrimination legislation.138
According to Kennedy, this similarity, combined with Congress’s choice not to change this
language with the FHA’s 1988 amendments, illustrates the legislature’s acceptance of the
judiciary’s disparate impact interpretation.139
After establishing the cognizability of disparate impact claims under the FHA, Kennedy
declined to intrude on the burden-shifting test established by HUD and implemented by the Fifth
Circuit. Instead, the Justice made a point to stress that this disparate impact doctrine required
limitations to “avoid the serious constitutional questions that might [otherwise] arise.” 140 He went
on to emphasize that a showing of disparate impact could not simply rely on “statistical disparity”
but must instead illustrate “robust causality” linking the defendant’s policies to the alleged
injustice.141 He closed by warning against the possibility that disparate impact-liability might
grow so “expansive as to inject racial considerations into every housing decision.” 142
In reaching this decision, the Court provided the capstone to the decades’ long march
toward unanimous recognition of disparate impact liability. But although this decision was
initially heralded by antidiscrimination advocates as a victory, 143 it is important to recognize just
how much (or how little) changed with this opinion. By declining to provide an alternative to the
burden-shifting test adopted by the Fifth Circuit, the Court ostensibly provided room for diversity
in the way lower courts establish burden of proof in disparate impact cases. However, the court
placed an important limitation on that lower court discretion: the “robust causality” requirement.
133
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celebrated by fair housing advocates).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018

286

UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE

[Vol. 21.4

Prior to the Court’s Inclusive Communities Project decision, the Fifth Circuit only required that
the prima facie showing “raise[ ] the inference of discrimination.” 144 After the Court’s decision,
however, that showing conclusively required more than statistical evidence of disparate impact.
Just how much more is still a hotly debated topic that will likely define the contours of the
disparate-impact debate for years to come.
C. Post-Inclusive Communities Project Cases

As of now, few federal courts have had occasion to decide a disparate-impact claim in
light of the Supreme Court’s Inclusive Communities Project decision. However, the few that have
ventured into this new territory are beginning to illustrate the ways that the landscape has changed
in the post-Inclusive Communities Project world. Indeed, in the few federal cases that have since
addressed this issue, none have found that the plaintiff reached its burden of proof in establishing
a prima facie case for disparate impact liability. 145 Instead, each of these cases have held, in part,
that the plaintiff failed to fulfill Justice Kennedy’s “robust causality” provision, ending the
discussion before it could reach the latter prongs of the burden-shifting test.
For example, in perhaps the most thorough disparate impact opinion since the Supreme
Court’s ruling—Inclusive Communities Project Inc. v. Texas Department of Housing and
Community Affairs (ICP VII)—the District Court for the Northern District of Texas reassessed
ICP’s disparate impact claim in light of the Supreme Court’s guidance. 146 In doing so, the court
walked through a newly modified burden-shifting test, shaped both by Justice Kennedy’s opinion
and guidance provided by the Fifth Circuit on remand.
First, the court asked if the plaintiff had “identif[ied] a facially-neutral policy that has
resulted in the disparate impact.”147 According to the court, because disparate impact litigation
aims to “remove impermissible barriers”, the burden lies with ICP to point to a specific policy that
created the barrier in the first place.148 On this question, the district court held that ICP failed at
meeting its burden.149 ICP, the court argued, had simply pointed to the Department’s use of
discretion in allocating credits as its discriminatory offense. 150 But a policy of discretion
encompasses numerous smaller decisions particular to each applicant. That the cumulative effect
of these various decisions was racial segregation does not point to a “constitutionally sound
remedy” that the court could order to address the inequity. 151 Discretion, as it turns out, is not a
policy; therefore, it does not fall under the purview of the court’s disparate impact jurisprudence.
Instead, a discretionary decision actually suggests disparate treatment, which requires
144
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs, No.
3:08-CV-0546-D, 2016 WL 4494322, at *1, *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2016).
145
See, e.g., id.; City of Miami v. Bank of America Corp., 171 F. Supp. 3d 1314, 1320 (S.D Fla. 2016);
City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 2:13–cv–09007–ODW(RZx), 2015 WL 4398858, at *1, *8 (C.D. Cal. July
17, 2015); Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, No. 14–cv–3045 (SRN/JJK), 2015 WL 5009341, at*1, *10 (D. Minn. Aug. 24,
2015).
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discriminatory intent.152 If the Department really was looking at each new application de novo and
assessing its individual merits, the fact that the decisions have cumulatively resulted in
segregation evinces a purposeful (or at least conscious) strategy on the part of the government.
Even though the court found that ICP had failed the policy identification prong, it went
on to assess, arguendo, the plaintiff’s case on the test’s second prong: did the identified policy
cause the discriminatory disparity?153 On this question, the court also found that ICP failed to
meet its burden of proof.154 According to the court, although ICP illustrated a statistical disparity
in the allocation of public housing credits, it did not “account[ ] for other potential causes of the
statistical disparity.”155 For example, actions by “Congress, the Texas Legislature, developers, and
local communities” all could have had an equal or greater impact on the distribution of LIHTC
units throughout the city.156 That ICP simply attributed all of the statistical disparity to the
Department’s discretion without much justification fell short of Justice Kennedy’s “robust
causality” standard.
Several other cases completed since the Supreme Court’s decision have all also failed to
prove disparate impact for similar reasons. In City of Miami v. Bank of America Corp. and City of
Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co., plaintiffs alleged that the defendant banks created a disparate
impact through lending policies that saddled low-income minorities with subprime mortgages
prior to the recession. 157 While this practice has been well documented, 158 both courts held that the
defendants had not convincingly established a prima facie case of disparate impact. 159 Part of the
courts’ reasoning for their decisions stemmed from an argument employed by the district court in
ICP VII: that the plaintiffs were actually making an argument for disparate treatment. The courts
argued that if, as the plaintiffs alleged, the banks had targeted blacks and Latinos for subprime
mortgages, this suggested conscious disparate treatment on the part of the banks, which required a
showing of discriminatory intent. 160 These cases illustrate how blurry the distinction between
disparate impact and disparate treatment actually is in practice. The Supreme Court recently
issued a consolidated opinion ruling on both of these cases, but did not comment on the disparate
impact issue.161
Similarly, the court in Inclusive Communities Project v. United States Department of
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2011), https://www.aclu.org/blog/predatory-lending-wall-street-profited-minority-families-paid-price [https://perma.cc/QX
33-XYXR].
159

See, e.g., City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., 171 F. Supp. at 1320.

160

See, e.g., id.

161
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Treasury (Department of Treasury) held that the plaintiffs failed to establish their prima facie case
of discrimination.162 In this case, ICP argued that the U.S. Department of Treasury, in facilitating
the LIHTC program, had a direct hand in causing the disparate impact underlying the previously
discussed cases against the Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs. 163 The court
once again sided with the defendants, this time leaning heavily on Justice Kennedy’s “robust
causality” requirement to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims. 164 According to the court, the Treasury’s
relationship to the distribution of public housing in Texas was far too attenuated to establish the
requisite causal link for a disparate impact claim. 165 While the Treasury certainly had a role in the
eventual developments, its part in the LIHTC saga had long passed by the time the choice was
made as to where the units should reside. In the interim, numerous third parties had a hand in the
process, including the Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs, the state legislature,
the local government, the developer, and the various community interests on the ground. To pin
the resulting segregation on just one party ignores the complexity of the real estate development
process. Even the Supreme Court alluded to this complexity, noting that it might “be difficult to
establish causation because of the multiple factors that go into investment decisions about where
to construct or renovate housing units.” 166
III. UPZONING AND DISPARATE IMPACT LIABILITY – A COGNIZABLE CAUSE OF ACTION?

Given the evidence gathered by scholars like Angotti and Morse on upzoning’s harmful
effects on low-income minority communities, at first glance it would appear that this kind of
policy would be ripe for a claim of disparate impact. During the early 2000’s, the Bloomberg
mayoral administration employed a conscious policy of liberalizing the zoning restrictions in a
handful of neighborhoods around the City. Almost invariably, as these once diverse areas grew in
density, they shrank in their numbers of minority residents. As bodegas and corner stores gave
way to Starbucks and cross-fit gyms, few would argue with the notion that the apparent result of
these upzoning policies was to transfer the neighborhoods’ agglomorative resources from the
historically disadvantaged to the historically advantaged. Though this may not have been the
administration’s conscious aim, it was no doubt a conscious policy resulting in disparately
discriminatory impact. In that way, upzoning and disparate impact liability seem made for each
other.
However, despite the initial appeal of this litigation strategy, several factors cut against
its potential for success. As stated above, in our post-Inclusive Communities Project world,
plaintiffs in disparate impact cases are required to establish a heightened (“robust”) burden of
proof to even put forth a prima facie showing of discrimination. Given this heightened standard,
bullishness regarding any claim of disparate impact would be manifestly unwise. Moreover,
upzoning policies, in particular, share many characteristics with policies that have failed in past
disparate impact cases. These commonalities may doom any upzoning case before it starts and
162
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caution against embracing litigation as a strategy against upzoning.
Part III of this paper explores the various contours of a hypothetical case against New
York City’s upzoning policies under disparate impact theory. Using a four-part burden-shifting
test derived, in part, from the HUD standards, the Inclusive Communities opinion, and successive
disparate impact cases, this portion of the paper will argue that while bringing a disparate impact
claim against the City’s upzoning policies may seem wise, this litigation strategy is likely to fail
for numerous reasons.
A. Did the Plaintiff Identify a Facially-Neutral Policy that Has Resulted in Disparate Impact?

One of the first steps plaintiffs must reach in establishing their prima facie showing of
disparate impact is identifying a facially neutral policy that caused the alleged harm. 167 As stated
previously, this step ensures that the court has a specific, identifiable policy upon which it can
graft an appropriate remedy to ameliorate the racial disparity. On its face, it would appear that any
claimant against the City of New York’s upzoning strategy would easily be able to identify a
facially neutral policy on which to craft a case. After all, the choices to upzone areas like
Williamsburg, Chinatown, and Harlem were much more than a series of one-off decisions, but
were instead part of a conscious and purposeful strategy employed by the Mayor to revitalize
particular “underutilized” portions of the city and ready them for commercial investment. 168
However, upon deeper inspection, multiple factors actually make this a much harder claim to
establish than it initially appears.
First, as stated previously, although it may appear that the decisions to upzone a
neighborhood are presented as faits accompli, in reality each of these choices is the result of
contemplated, individualized assessments exploring the appropriateness of upzoning for the area
in question. Policymakers study the environmental effects of the rezoning, the demand for new
housing, the possibility of increased commercial activity, the neighborhood’s connectivity to
public transit, and (although it may not seem like it) the impact this decision will have on existing
residents. After taking those factors (and many others) into account, the city proposes a finely
tailored rezoning package for the neighborhood, based on the information gathered from its study,
as well as the political considerations attendant to any large policy decision. In addition to the
upzoning changes, this package will likely include downzonings in some other areas, as well as
measures aimed at historical preservation.
In this way, it is likely that no two rezoning packages will look alike. Instead, the
decision to rezone a neighborhood more closely resembles the Department’s discretionary
decisions in Inclusive Communities Project. In that series of cases, the decision of how to allocate
LIHTC credits was also a highly particularized, discretionary decision based off the best
judgement of the expert agency and the information it gathered on the ground. In that case, the
court decided that the Department’s discretionary decision-making process was not a “facially
neutral policy” for the purposes of the disparate impact test. According to the court, simply
identifying a policy of discretion leaves the judge in the difficult position of having to propose a
remedy to a multi-faceted and ever-changing process.
167
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Texas Dep’t of Housing and Cmty. Affairs, No. 3:08-CV-0546D, 2016 WL 4494322 *6 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
168
See ANGOTTI & MORSE, supra note 5 at 13 (explaining that Mayor Bloomberg’s rezoning strategy was
part of a larger effort to promote New York as a “luxury city”).
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What, in this case, would an appropriate judicial remedy look like? A judge could not in
good faith tell the city to not ever rezone another majority minority neighborhood. The minority
residents likely would not even support that! Similarly, telling the city to avoid upzoning majority
minority neighborhoods seems an equally blunt tool that might not achieve its stated end. Indeed,
given the complicated relationship between zoning and housing prices, it is possible that a policy
of no longer upzoning gentrifying neighborhoods would actually have the unintended
consequence of raising housing prices even more than they would have under the upzoning
regime.169 Although the evidence is far from conclusive on this matter, it is not hard to imagine
that courts may be receptive to the “trickle-down” theory of housing supply given their historic
receptiveness to traditional housing barrier cases (as opposed to housing improvement cases). 170
Moreover, as stated previously, a disparate impact claim against a discretionary policy
seems a bit contradictory. If the policy is indeed discretionary—i.e., the policymakers are actually
assessing the merits of each individual case before reaching a finely tailored decision—does that
not suggest that their ultimate decision was, in fact, intentional? If, as Angotti and Morse
illustrate, the City is actually targeting “underutilized” minority neighborhoods for upzoning
changes, that would actually suggest disparate treatment on the part of the government, which
requires a showing of discriminatory intent. While that discriminatory intent may exist, the
appropriate vehicle for proving it is not a disparate impact claim. For these reasons, plaintiffs
would likely fail at establishing a facially neutral policy on which they could ground their
disparate impact claim.
B. Does the Plaintiff’s Disparate Impact Claim Meet Justice Kennedy’s “Robust Causality”
Requirement?

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the plaintiff was able to establish a facially
neutral policy upon which they could sustain their disparate impact claim, they would still have to
satisfy the second requirement of their prima facie case: establishing causality. 171 Once again, on
its face, a claim of disparate impact against New York City’s upzoning policies seems to easily
reach this standard. Angotti and Morse have illustrated that since the Mayor’s upzoning initiative
took place, in Williamsburg alone property values increased by almost 250%, median monthly
rents grew from $949 to $1603, the neighborhood’s subsidized housing stock dropped from 64%
to 51.7%, and the area’s white population increased by 44%, while its Latino population declined
by 27%.172 But, as Justice Kennedy warned, “statistical disparity” alone does not a disparate
impact make.173 Instead, plaintiffs are admonished to establish a clear and convincing causal link
between the offending policy and the resulting disparity. 174 By this standard, plaintiffs bringing a
disparate impact claim against the City’s upzoning policies would likely fail.
169
For further evidence of the potential link between restrictive zoning and rising housing prices, see
generally, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, CALIFORNIA’S HIGH HOUSING COSTS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (Mar.
17, 2015) (illustrating the link between California’s high housing costs and restrictive zoning/environmental review
policies).
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The reality is that development choices are complicated, multifaceted, multimember
decisions that cannot be sufficiently distilled into one policy or practice. While the City may have
made the ultimate call as to whether it should rezone a neighborhood, that decision was influenced
by developers’ opinions, housing and economic trends, and conversations with residents on the
ground. Additionally, a simple rezoning cannot alone gentrify a neighborhood. Indeed, the City
could have made the most sweeping zoning ordinance changes in history and it would have
resulted in no changes to the built environment, without private parties taking the initiative to act
on that reform. Developers had to choose to build the luxury buildings that warped the
neighborhoods’ housing markets. High-end retailers had to choose to move into ground-floor
spaces and cater to the new professional demographic. Unscrupulous landlords, like Tranquilina
Alvillar’s, had to choose to push their current tenants out of the apartment to make room for
upper-income renters. And, perhaps most crucially, well-heeled professionals had to choose to
move into the neighborhood, altering its demographics and precipitating all of the attendant
changes that come with gentrification. Like the federal government in the Department of Treasury
case,175 the City’s decision was simply the first in a long line of necessary ingredients for urban
gentrification and displacement.
This upzoning hypothetical clearly illustrates Seicshnaydre’s aforementioned
argument176—home improvement policies do not make for strong disparate impact claims. Code
enforcement cases, blight demolition, LIHTC allocation, and upzoning decisions all share the
common attribute of being additive or ameliorative policies as opposed to simple barriers to new
developments. The reality of these kinds of policies is that they often implicate multiple parties
and independent decisions before their full force is realized. This leaves judges in the difficult
position of having to disambiguate causal links and appropriately mete blame where blame is due.
While the City’s zoning policies might carry some of the blame for the resulting displacement,
determining how much blame and the appropriate remedy is a tall order. Courts might simply not
be up to the challenge.
C. Was the Defendant’s Action Necessary to Achieve One or More Substantial, Legitimate,
Nondiscriminatory Interests?

Although none of the most recent disparate impact cases have reached this stage of the
burden shifting analysis, assuming a claim against upzoning did survive the prima facie showing
of discrimination, the next task would be for the defendant to provide a legitimate justification for
the offending action.177 On this question, the City of New York would likely have a compelling
answer.
First, the City would likely argue that the upzoning decisions were necessary for
economic development purposes. Although this may seem like the kind of rent-seeking behavior
that the plaintiffs are trying to enjoin, the reality is that courts have long held that urban economic
development is a sufficient justification for intrusive government policies. Indeed, in numerous
cases, the courts have rejected plaintiffs’ calls for relief from actions more pernicious than
upzoning on the grounds that the government had a legitimate interest in fostering economic
175

Inclusive Communities Project v. United States Dep’t. of Treasury, No. 3:14-CV-3013-D, 2016 WL
6397643 *12 (N.D. Tex. 20116).
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development in whatever manner it deems most appropriate.178 Whether or not the policy will
actually result in economic development (or the right kind of economic development) is not an
issue with which the courts typically concern themselves.
In addition to the economic development argument, the City will likely deploy a whole
host of smaller—but similarly convincing—claims. For example, the City will likely argue that
adding density serves a clear environmental benefit. Residents in dense cities have less need to
own a car, walk more, commute shorter distances, and leave smaller carbon footprints. A
government interested in combating the harmful effects of climate change would likely encourage
cities to add density in exactly the way New York has in these gentrifying neighborhoods.
Additionally, the City will likely argue that these upzoning concessions are actually furthering its
affordable housing agenda. In many cities like New York, governments grant developers
upzoning concessions in exchange for promises that these developers will preserve a particular
percentage of their new units as affordable housing. 179 These “inclusionary zoning” policies aim
to fill the gaps left by decreasing state and federal funds for affordable or public housing.
Inclusionary zoning is appealing to cities because it does not require that they allocate any
additional funds to the construction of these new affordable units. Instead, by leveraging their
power over zoning policy, cities can exact these financial concessions from developers interested
in building as many units as possible. While it is unclear how a court would assess this
inclusionary zoning justification, it is not outside the realm of possibility that they would receive
it positively.
D. Can the Challenged Practice be Served by Another Practice that has a Less Discriminatory Effect?

The final question in the burden-shifting test advocated by HUD is for the plaintiff to
suggest to the court alternative, less-discriminatory mechanisms by which the government could
achieve its stated justifications.180 Here, although the plaintiffs will likely suggest numerous
alternatives to the government’s zoning policies (many of which will be discussed in Part IV), the
reality is that these policy suggestions will likely extend beyond the reach of a court-sanctioned
remedy. Ideas like community-based planning, community land trusts, and robust public housing
investment are policies that require political input—not the kinds of remedies that could be
handed down by a court. Additionally, many of these policies require complicated, multiparty
input processes to stand a chance of success. Courts are often reluctant to mandate that cities
undertake these kinds of complicated alternatives given their resource intensive nature.
IV. POTENTIAL POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND CONCLUSION

Just because the City’s upzoning policy would likely survive a disparate impact claim
does not diminish the very real inequities these policies can cause for many of New York’s most
vulnerable citizens. The law is often an unfortunately blunt tool, and is not necessarily the best
mechanism for effecting change in every case. Instead, lawmakers and housing advocates should
focus their attention on creative policy solutions to the multifaceted problems of gentrification and
displacement. By championing reforms that reframe the way we think about housing and
178
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encourage neighborhood-level development decisions, concerned policymakers may be able to
inject a modicum of equity into our otherwise unequal national housing policy.
One potential reform, championed by authors Angotti and Morse, is an unequivocal
reaffirmation of housing as a public good.181 Historically, for example, the primary mechanism for
providing affordable housing in cities like New York was through units owned, operated, and
maintained by the public.182 Municipal housing authorities across the country each housed tens of
thousands of people in units that were permanently affordable for low-income and working-class
residents.183 Changes in neighborhood demographics or land use designations did not threaten that
permanence—those units were guaranteed by the government and therefore largely insulated from
any economic tumult occurring in the traditional housing market.
Today the distinction between public and private housing is falling apart. Many of the
substantive reforms in the affordable housing world are occurring under the guise of “publicprivate partnerships.”184 These privately facilitated policies, like inclusionary zoning, lack many
of the protections and advantages inherent in a more traditional public housing regime. For
example, while inclusionary zoning programs aim to counteract the lack of new affordable public
housing units, in practice they often end up serving a demographic noticeably wealthier than the
intended recipients of the original public housing programs. 185 While the lack of affordable
middle-income housing is certainly an issue in places like New York, 186 simply replacing much
needed low-income units with middle-income units does little to stem the tide of displacement
blanketing many urban neighborhoods.
Skeptics will no doubt argue that truly affordable public housing is simply not a financial
reality for most cities. With federal and state governments curbing many of their traditional
investments in those types of programs, 187 cities have no choice but to turn to the private sector
for a suboptimal alternative. However, this ostensibly pragmatic resignation ignores many of the
encouraging innovations succeeding at securing permanently affordable housing around the
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country. For example, community land trusts in cities like Boston, 188 Durham,189 and
Albuquerque190 have illustrated that local, pubic control of traditionally private assets can go a
long way to providing meaningful homeownership opportunities for low-income Americans.
Under this model, locally managed community organizations retain ownership of neighborhood
land that they then use to build and sell homes at significantly lower-than-market prices.191 By
removing the cost of land from the construction equation, 192 these organizations have been able to
develop an ecosystem of truly affordable housing in some of the most desirable urban locations.
Community land trusts have shown that by returning to a model centered on public ownership,
cities are still making good on the promise of economic inclusivity.
Another potential avenue for reform seeks to empower local voices in the zoning
process. At its core, the community-based planning movement simply asserts that residents living
in areas slated for change ought to have some real say in how their neighborhoods develop. 193
Achieving this admittedly modest goal requires two formal concessions from city governments.
First, it requires that large city governments create neighborhood planning councils with real
power to drive zoning change. Although some form of neighborhood planning council exists in
most major American cities, these bodies often exercise little more than advisory powers in the
zoning process.194 While full veto power almost certainly is not appropriate, the ability to cast
votes of consequence over the changes occurring in their neighborhoods is necessary for ensuring
that municipal policies do not completely trample local considerations.
Second, true community-based planning requires community plans with actual teeth.
New York is one of the few major American cities without an overarching comprehensive plan.195
While many neighborhoods have local plans for how they want to structure future development,
these plans do not carry the force of law and amount to little more than “wish lists” for
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policymakers to ignore.196 For community-based plans to carry any real consequence, courts and
city leaders should follow Professor Haar’s advice and treat them as “impermanent
constitution[s]” that trump parcel-level zoning designations when conflicts arise. 197 This ensures
that the overarching vision for a neighborhood (and a city) remains intact as policymakers go
about the business of making isolated zoning decisions.
Neither of these changes will, by themselves, be able to reshape our unequal and unstable
housing market. Nor will securing either of these changes prove easy. Enacting change through
the political branches invariably requires time, money, and energy for the mere hope of success.
Part of the seduction of sweeping judicial decisions is that they allow us to avoid the messiness of
politics: crafting a sound argument, presenting it to the right judge, and waiting for change to
follow. But, as I hope this paper illustrates, not all change is best served by judicial action. While
addressing the inequities in urban land use policy through disparate impact litigation may seem
attractive, that vehicle is not likely to secure the kind of changes we seek. Instead, lawmakers and
housing advocates should prepare to put in the hard work of effecting political change in our
cities’ zoning systems. We should not settle for anything less.
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